Toleration, Approval, and the Right to Marry: On Constitutional Limitations and Preferential Treatment by Strasser, Mark
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
11-1-2001
Toleration, Approval, and the Right to Marry: On
Constitutional Limitations and Preferential
Treatment
Mark Strasser
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark Strasser, Toleration, Approval, and the Right to Marry: On Constitutional Limitations and Preferential Treatment, 35 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
65 (2001).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol35/iss1/3
TOLERATION, APPROVAL, AND THE RIGHT
TO MARRY: ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS AND PREFERENTIAL
TREATMENT
Mark Strasser*
I. INTRODUCTION
Some commentators who disapprove of same-sex marriages or
civil unions' claim that the state should not legally recognize such
relationships because the state's doing so would endorse rather than
merely tolerate them. These theorists explain the difference between
endorsement and toleration by pointing to the endorsement test in Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence, or by discussing the difference be-
tween constitutionally protected activity on the one hand and activity
subject to statutory regulation on the other. Yet, the existing Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence in particular and the Court's constitu-
tional jurisprudence more generally suggest that the state is pre-
cluded from expressing approval of some citizens to make other
citizens feel like outsiders. Further, the difference between legisla-
tive permission and constitutional protection does not support the
state's refusal to recognize same-sex unions but, instead, helps illus-
trate why such unions must not only be recognized but also afforded
constitutional protection.
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School, Rich-
mond, Virginia (Fall, 2001); Professor of Law, Capital University Law School,
Columbus, Ohio; B.A. 1977, Harvard College; M.A. 1980, University of Chi-
cago; Ph.D 1984, University of Chicago; J.D. 1993, Stanford Law School.
1. See Vermont Governor Signs 'Civil Unions' Bill, THE CHRISTIAN
CENTURY, May 10, 2000, at 532 (describing civil unions as a "parallel track [to
marriage] ... which would give homosexual partners the property and other
legal rights already given to heterosexual spouses").
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Part II of this Article explores the concept of toleration, conclud-
ing that the tolerant state must not adopt policies to make some
members of society feel like second-class citizens. Part III suggests
that commentators pointing to the difference between constitution-
ally protected and legislatively permitted activities misapply that dis-
tinction when seeking to explain why states should refuse to recog-
nize same-sex relationships, since these commentators conflate
privileging a status with privileging particular citizens. The Article
concludes that those commentators who distinguish between toler-
ance and endorsement to justify the state's refusal to recognize same-
sex relationships help establish why the state must, rather than
should not, recognize those unions.
II. ON TOLERANCE AND ENDORSEMENT
Some commentators suggest that same-sex relationships should
not be legally recognized by the state because doing so would imply
some sort of approval of those unions. Yet, that thesis is incorrect
both because legal recognition does not imply approval and because,
even if it did, that would not be a reason to refuse to recognize such
relationships. Indeed, the thesis that states should or even may re-
fuse to recognize same-sex unions simply because they disapprove of
them ignores and, in fact, contradicts the developing right-to-marry
jurisprudence.
A. The Background Marriage Jurisprudence
Some commentators suggest that the state should not express
approval of same-sex unions by legally recognizing them-Richard
Duncan and Lynn Wardle claim that such a recognition would confer
on such unions "a legally preferred status."2 This argument implies
that: (1) the state endorses those marriages that it recognizes, and (2)
2. Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Le-
gitimate a Retreat from Marriage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEX. L. REV.
735, 752 (1998); see also Richard F. Duncan, Homosexual Marriage and the
Myth of Tolerance: Is Cardinal O'Connor a "Homophobe"?, 10 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 587, 593 (1996) ("[T]he demand for same-sex mar-
riage laws is a call not for tolerance but for approval, encouragement and pre-
ferred status .... A tolerant society might decide that homosexual behavior,
although permitted between consenting adults, should nevertheless be discour-
aged or at least deprived of public encouragement.").
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the conviction" after having explained that "[m]arriage, the most
elementary and useful of all, must be regulated and controlled by the
sovereign power of the state."' 2 Because the state did not recognize
the validity of his marriage, Kinney's conviction for nonmarital co-
habitation could stand.
The Indiana Supreme Court expressed a similar view when that
state's interracial marriage prohibition was challenged. In State v.
Gibson,'3 the court upheld the state's anti-miscegenation statute, ex-
plaining that "[t]he right in the states, to regulate and control, to
guard, protect, and preserve this God-given, civilizing, and Christian-
izing institution [marriage] is of inestimable importance, and cannot
be surrendered, nor can the states suffer or permit any interference
therewith."'14 The Supreme Courts of Georgia and Tennessee also
found that their respective state legislatures had the power to pre-
clude interracial marriage.' 5
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court made clear in Loving
v. Virginia16 that the states do not have the power to prohibit interra-
cial marriage, even if the states disapprove of such marriages. The
Court pointed out that the freedom to marry is "one of the vital per-
sonal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness,"' 7 and that
"the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides
11. See id. at 870.
12. Id. at 869.
13. 36 Ind. 389 (1871).
14. Id. at 403.
15. See Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 324 (1869) ("The Legislature certainly
had as much right to regulate the marriage relation by prohibiting it between
persons of different races as they had to prohibit it between persons within the
Levitical degrees, or between idiots."); Doc. Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 He-
isk.) 287, (1877) stating:
These police powers of the state extend to every conceivable subject,
where the good order, the domestic peace, the private happiness or
public welfare of the people demand legislation. Unless that legisla-
tion is inhibited in the fundamental law, no State has acquitted itself of
the duties of government without it. We hold that such legislation is
not, never has been, and never should be, prohibited to the States, in
reference to the intermarriage of the races.
Id. at 310.
16. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. Id. at 12.
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the bare desire not to endorse a union suffices as a justification for a
state's refusing to recognize it.3 Neither thesis is correct or even
plausible, although these theses might have been thought persuasive
had they been offered at an earlier time in our constitutional history.
In 1877, the United States Supreme Court suggested in Pen-
noyer v. NeffJ4 that the state "has absolute right to prescribe the condi-
tions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall
be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved 5 and,
eleven years later, suggested in Maynard v. Hill6 that "[m]arriage, as
creating the most important relation in life, as having more to do
with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institu-
tion,... [is] subject to the control of the legislature."7 Further, dur-
ing that same period, various state supreme courts made clear their
understanding that the state has almost unlimited discretion with re-
spect to which marriages it will recognize.
8
Often, the issue arose in the state courts in the form of a chal-
lenge to a state's anti-miscegenation statute. For example, Kinney v.
Commonwealth9 involved an interracial couple, domiciled in Vir-
ginia, who had married in the District of Columbia in accord with lo-
cal law. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had to determine
the validity of the marriage because Kinney had been charged with
and convicted of lewd association and cohabitation, 10 a conviction
which could only stand if in fact he was not legally married to Ma-
hala Miller, the woman with whom he was cohabiting in Virginia
and whom he had married in Washington, D.C. The court affirmed
3. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 595-96.
4. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
5. Id. at 734-35; see also Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, 163 (1901)
("The State, for example, has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon
which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the
causes for which it may be dissolved.").
6. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
7. Id. at 205.
8. See, e.g., Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877) (suggesting that marriage
is subject to the control of the state); State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1877)
(suggesting that the state may determine the conditions under which its domi-
ciliaries will be prohibited from marrying).
9. 71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858 (1878).
10. See id. at 858-59.
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cial marriage, even if the states disapprove of such marriages. The
Court pointed out that the freedom to marry is "one of the vital per-
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11. See id. at 870.
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13. 36 Ind. 389 (1871).
14. Id. at 403.
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Levitical degrees, or between idiots."); Doc. Lonas v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 He-
isk.) 287, (1877) stating:
These police powers of the state extend to every conceivable subject,
where the good order, the domestic peace, the private happiness or
public welfare of the people demand legislation. Unless that legisla-
tion is inhibited in the fundamental law, no State has acquitted itself of
the duties of government without it. We hold that such legislation is
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reference to the intermarriage of the races.
Id. at 310.
16. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. Id. at 12.
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ing that same period, various state supreme courts made clear their
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8
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Commonwealth9 involved an interracial couple, domiciled in Vir-
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the validity of the marriage because Kinney had been charged with
and convicted of lewd association and cohabitation,'0 a conviction
which could only stand if in fact he was not legally married to Ma-
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their "expressive" value,29 despite the fact that the laws prohibiting
such unions have been unenforceable since Loving.
Individuals might disagree about the expressive content of an
unenforceable anti-miscegenation statute that remains on the books.
Some would claim that it expresses societal disapproval of interracial
marriage, while others would claim that it expresses racism ° or, per-
haps, provincial attitudes31 indicating that the state would not be a
good place in which a business should locate or expand.32 Regard-
less of which expressive content is most plausibly ascribed when a
state keeps such a law on the books, it is quite clear that South Caro-
lina, which only repealed the relevant constitutional provision pre-
venting interracial marriage in 1998, 3 and Alabama, which repealed
the relevant provision in 2000,34 can hardly be said to have given in-
terracial unions their stamp of approval over the past thirty years, de-
spite having recognized such marriages since Loving. The fact that
South Carolina and Alabama kept the anti-miscegenation statutes on
the books even after those states had begun recognizing such
29. See Couples Find Interracial Marriage Draws Mixed Acceptance Lo-
cally, HERALD (Rock Hill, SC), Mar. 8, 1998, at 1A ("While the interracial ban
lacks legal clout and is largely symbolic, it still reflects a widely held senti-
ment."). So, too, repealing the provision from the South Carolina Constitution
was viewed as symbolic. See Controversial Amendments, supra note 27 (stat-
ing that "[t]his amendment was, in large part, a symbolic one"). Of course, the
fact that over a third of the electorate opposed ending the ban might also be
viewed as symbolic. See id.
30. See Ban Is an Embarrassment, HERALD (Rock Hill, SC), Feb. 12, 1998,
at 1 lA (stating that "the interracial ban is inarguably motivated by racism");
The Mobile Register on Amendment Two, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEwswmEs,
Sept. 7, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Group File ("Instead of banning
the marriages themselves, the constitution dances deftly around the issue by
prohibiting the state from allowing them .... That's racism. And no amount
of discombobulating can obscure the fact.").
31. See Ban Is an Embarrassment, supra note 30 ("Even a narrow margin
in favor of removing it could make the state look backward.").
32. See Rawls, supra note 28 ("'Defeating Amendment Two will send the
wrong message to the corporate world,' Siegelman said Tuesday.").
33. See Controversial Amendments, supra note 27 (stating that the provi-
sion had been repealed by the voters on Election Day, November 3, 1998).
34. See Sharon Cohen, Voters Reject School Vouchers, Back Billions for
Public Education, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Nov. 8, 2000, LEXIS,
Nexis Library, News Group File ("In Alabama, voters lifted a 99-year-old, un-
enforceable ban on interracial marriage. Alabama was the last state in the na-
tion to have in its constitution this relic from the era of segregation.").
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marriages suggests at least two weaknesses in the argument that
states should not endorse same-sex marriages by recognizing them:
(1) claims to the contrary notwithstanding, states can legally recog-
nize unions without endorsing them, and (2) if states are not permit-
ted to refuse to recognize interracial marriages, even if in fact they
disapprove of such unions, it is not at all clear why the disapproval of
same-sex unions justifies a refusal to recognize those unions.3
C. Toleration Versus Acceptance
Part of the disagreement over whether states should recognize
same-sex unions involves differing analyses concerning whether tol-
eration and endorsement are compatible. Commentators disagree
about whether an individual who is tolerant of another's practices
implicitly disapproves of those practices or, instead, has no implicit
position about those practices whatsoever. Yet, even were it clear
what an individual would be saying were she merely to tolerate an-
other's beliefs or practices, that would not establish what the state
would be saying were it tolerant of different groups. Whether or not
one assumes that the "tolerant" individual implicitly disapproves of
those whom she tolerates, one should not make such an assumption
about the tolerant state.
Michael Walzer suggests that individuals who "make room for
men and women whose beliefs they don't adopt, whose practices
they decline to imitate,, 36 i.e., who "possess the virtue of toler-
ance," 37 have that quality "without regard to their standing on the
continuum of resignation, indifference, stoical acceptance, curiosity,
and enthusiasm" 38 of the beliefs or practices at issue. Thus, accord-
ing to Walzer, individuals may appropriately be said to be tolerant
even if in fact they have no objections to and, in fact, approve of the
attitudes or practices of which they are tolerant.
39
35. Cf WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 216-17 (1999) ("But surely the state cannot en-
courage people to feel attraction only for those of their own race. If not, why
can the state encourage people to feel attraction only for those of the opposite
sex?").
36. MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 11 (1997).
37. Id. at 12.
38. Id.
39. See also Barbara Herman, Pluralism and the Community of Moral
[Vol. 35:65
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Other commentators offer a different view. For example, Ber-
nard Williams distinguishes between indifference and tolerance. He
points out that if, for example, a same-sex relationship "arouse[s] no
hostile comment or reaction," the lack of a reaction might be based
on "indifference rather than, strictly speaking, toleration." 40 While
this lack of reaction might be thought "toleration as a matter of prac-
tice,"4' Williams would hesitate to call these people merely "toler-
ant" if they had ceased to think the behavior "a matter for disap-
proval or negative judgment at all." 42  Strictly speaking, he is
tempted to call a group tolerant only when it "as a matter of fact puts
up with the existence of the other, differing, group." 43 Thus, in his
view, tolerance is not only to be distinguished from endorsement, but
also from indifference, and "toleration" should only be used when
the object of toleration elicits disapproval.44
Steven Smith's analysis is similar to Williams'. Smith writes,
"Properly speaking, one can 'tolerate' only beliefs or practices of
which one disapproves. 'A5 He offers an example to illustrate his
point, suggesting that while a community might tolerate prostitution
or pornography, it would not tolerate honesty, compassion, or artistic
achievement.46 Yet, Smith's analysis is less persuasive than it first
appears. For example, it would be perfectly coherent for someone to
say that a community not only tolerates but positively encourages a
particular quality such as honesty-it is not as if "tolerates" would
have been used incorrectly or improperly there.
Judgment, in TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE 60, 61 (David Heyd ed.,
1996) ("If, for example, we are to be tolerant of diversity in private consensual
sexual conduct, our tolerance is compatible with private disdain for, or abhor-
rence of, some of the tolerated activity.") (emphasis added). By suggesting
that tolerance is "compatible" with disdain, Herman is also suggesting that it is
compatible with approval, i.e., that tolerance is neutral with respect to the pos-
sessor's attitude toward the activity in question.
40. Bernard Williams, Toleration: An Impossible Virtue? in TOLERATION:
AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE, supra note 39, at 18, 20.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 19.
44. See Williams, supra note 40 and accompanying text (suggesting that
indifferent actions might be thought tolerant as a matter of practice).
45. Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REV. 305,
306 (1990).
46. Id.
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As a separate point, Smith may have been misled by his own ex-
amples. Consider a community that tolerates different religious or
political views. The community is presumably not saying that it dis-
approves of those religious or political views, even if it would, in
fact, disapprove of prostitution or pornography. Thus, while a com-
munity might disapprove of some of its objects of toleration, that
same community might approve of or be indifferent towards other
objects of its toleration.
In Webster's Third New International Dictionary, the definition
of "tolerate" includes both "to permit the existence or practice of:
allow without prohibition or hindrance: make no effort to prevent"
and "to endure with forbearance or restraint: put up with: bear.
'A7
The former definition suggests nothing about the tolerant individ-
ual's attitudes, since she might make no effort to prevent the expres-
sion of attitudes of which she disapproves or, for that matter, ap-
proves. The latter definition suggests some sort of disapproval, since
one would not need to "put up with" attitudes with which one agreed.
Thus, there would seem to be at least two senses of "tolerance," a
broader sense that does not imply any particular attitude toward that
which is tolerated, and a narrow sense that implies disapproval.48
Arguably, an individual who merely tolerates another might be
inferred to be "putting up with" that person and, in addition, not to be
giving that person "equal concern and respect."49 Yet, even if that is
so, it is unclear whether such an inference is justified because of the
word "tolerate" or, instead, because of the word "merely." Arguably,
use of the words "merely tolerates" implies disapproval or, perhaps,
indifference, which would not have been implied by use of the word
"tolerates" alone.
Even if a person 's toleration of something or someone else im-
plies indifference or disapproval, a separate question is whether a
47. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 2405 (3d ed. 1986).
48. See George P. Fletcher, The Instability of Tolerance, in TOLERATION:
AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE, supra note 39, at 158, 169 ("Among those more tolerant
of homosexuality, the problem is distinguishing among the sentiments of indif-
ference, acceptance, and tolerance in the narrow sense.").
49. Cf Smith, supra note 45, at 306 ("[A] proponent of liberal democracy
is likely to believe that one should not merely 'tolerate' those who are differ-
ent, but should extend to them an 'equal concern and respect."').
[Vol. 3 5:65
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state's toleration of particular religions or races, for example, implies
disapproval of those races or religions. Whether or not it is appro-
priate to infer the narrow sense of "tolerate" when describing the atti-
tude of an individual who (merely) tolerates others, the broad sense
of "tolerate" both is and should be used when the state is tolerating
someone or something. A state that tolerated, but disapproved of,
particular races or religions would hardly be thought particularly tol-
erant,50 and the same might be said of a state that tolerated, but dis-
approved of, some of its citizens on the basis of their sexual orienta-
tion.51
These two different issues should not be conflated. Certainly, it
is correct to suggest that individuals working to secure rights for les-
bians, gays, bisexuals, and transgendered people "do not like to be
treated as second best... [nor] merely to be tolerated." 52 Further,
acceptance might be distinguished from tolerance,53 which itself
might be distinguished from indifference. 54 That said, it is a mistake
to claim that "acceptance would be expressed by legally recognizing
same-sex marriages," 55 at least insofar as one would thereby be im-
plying either that such unions should not be recognized until such
acceptance exists, or that the recognition of such unions would
automatically bring about that acceptance.
As an examination of the recent history of the anti-
miscegenation laws of South Carolina and Alabama reveals, racial
acceptance should not be assumed merely because a state recognizes
50. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out": Relig-
ion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public
Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2412 (1997) ("America has internalized the idea of
benign religious variation, that there are a number of equally good religions,
and one's religion says little or nothing about one's moral or personal worth.").
51. See SUSAN MENDUS, TOLERATION AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM 150
(1989) ("Similar points can be made about religious toleration and sexual tol-
eration.").
52. Fletcher, supra note 48, at 170.
53. A fortiori, "full social acceptance" might be distinguished from "merely
a grudging social toleration." See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 646 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
54. See Fletcher, supra note 48, at 170.
55. Id. The claim here is not that Professor Fletcher is against such accep-
tance, for he has "confess[ed] to a certain amount of sympathy for this push
toward acceptance rather than tolerance or indifference toward homosexual-
ity." Id.
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interracial marriages. 56 This is true both because recognition of in-
terracial marriage occurred before everyone accepted such unions
and because the recognition of those unions did not suddenly cause
people to discard their biased attitudes. 57 While the refusal to recog-
nize interracial marriage involved invidious racial discrimination, the
removal of those bans did not suddenly extirpate the prejudicial atti-
tudes that motivated such bans.
In Loving v. Virginia,58 the Supreme Court recognized that Vir-
ginia's anti-miscegenation law was a manifestation of the state's
preference for some of its citizens over others.59 The Court ex-
plained, "The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages
involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications
must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to main-
tain White Supremacy." 60 This attempt by the state to indicate its
preference for some of its citizens over others was a reason to invali-
date the statute-there was no "legitimate overriding purpose inde-
pendent of invidious racial discrimination which justifie[d] [the]
classification." 61 While the Court would have struck down the stat-
ute as "repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, even assuming an
even-handed state purpose to protect the 'integrity' of all races," 62 it
was clear that the Court was especially offended by the racial classi-
fications which were "so directly subversive of the principle of
equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment." 63 Thus, while
the Court clearly understands the difference between toleration and
preference, the Court has not endorsed the preference model for
56. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text (discussing the recogni-
tion but nonacceptance of interracial marriage in South Carolina and Ala-
bama).
57. Twenty-four years after Loving was decided, a significant number of
whites still disapproved of interracial marriage. See Elizabeth Kristen, The
Struggle for Same-Sex Marriage Continues, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 104,
114 n.98 (1999) ("A 1991 Gallup Poll found that 45% of white people in the
U.S. still disapprove of interracial marriages, while only 44% approve.").
58. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
59. See id. at 11.
60. Id.
61. Id. (striking down the statute as an attempt to maintain White Suprem-
acy).
62. Id. at 11 nil.
63. Id. at 12.
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determining which marriages should be recognized. Indeed, it is es-
pecially ironic that some commentators want to use the endorsement
test in Establishment Clause jurisprudence as the appropriate model
for determining the kinds of preferences the state may manifest,
since that model undermines the very position that these commenta-
tors propose.
D. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
Professor Lynn Wardle points out that "states universally draw
distinctions between tolerance and preference," 64 citing the endorse-
ment test in Establishment Clause jurisprudence to establish that
point.6  Yet, even a brief consideration of that jurisprudence helps to
prove why the state should-rather than should not-recognize
same-sex unions.
In Lynch v. Donnelly,66 the Supreme Court suggested that the
Constitution "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any," explain-
ing that "[a]nything less would require the 'callous indifference' we
have said was never intended by the Establishment Clause."67 Jus-
tice O'Connor made clear in her Lynch concurrence, however, that
accommodation is not the equivalent of endorsement. 68 "Endorse-
ment sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying mes-
sage to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the po-
litical community., 69 The Court will pay "particularly close atten-
tion to whether [a] challenged governmental practice either has the
purpose or effect of 'endorsing' religion, a concern that has long had
64. Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-
Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 61.
65. See id. at 58 n.257 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)).
66. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
67. Id. at 673.
68. See id. at 688.
69. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000) ("School sponsorship of a religious message
is impermissible because it sends the ancillary message to members of the au-
dience who are nonadherents 'that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community."') (citing Lynch, 465
U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence." 70 Further, in this
jurisprudence, the issue is not whether the state has "endorsed" rather
than, for example, merely "preferred" one religion over another. As
the Court made clear in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,71 "[w]hether
the key word is 'endorsement,' 'favoritism,' or 'promotion,' the es-
sential principle remains the same."
72
Commentators are correct to suggest that there is an important
difference between permitting and endorsing a practice. However,
they draw exactly the wrong inference from that acknowledged dis-
tinction. The state should tolerate and even accommodate different
religions, but must not endorse one over another or even religion
over nonreligion.73 Just as the endorsement test in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence precludes the state from treating nonadherents
of a particular faith as outsiders who are not full members of the
community, an endorsement test should preclude the state from de-
nying individuals the right to marry because it wants to tell those in-
dividuals that they are outsiders who are not full members of the
community.
E. On Different Classes of Citizenship
It might be argued that worries about the state's endorsement or
preference of some groups over others is relevant in the context of
70. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989).
71. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
72. Id. at 593. For further discussion of the issue see Capitol Square Re-
view & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763-64 (1995).
We must note, to begin with, that it is not really an "endorsement test"
of any sort, much less the "endorsement test" which appears in our
more recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence, that petitioners urge
upon us. "Endorsement" connotes an expression or demonstration of
approval or support. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 818
(1993); Webster's New Dictionary 845 (2d ed. 1950). Our cases have
accordingly equated "endorsement" with "promotion" or "favoritism."
Id. (citing Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593).
73. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 605 (noting that the Court has held the Es-
tablishment Clause "to mean no official preference even for religion over non-
religion") (citing Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989)); see also
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985) ("[T]he Court has unambigu-
ously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the
First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at
all.").
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religion, but not in other contexts. Such a view is mistaken, even if
one brackets the claim that animus against lesbian, gay, bisexual, or
transgendered people might be religiously based.74 There is a long
tradition establishing that the state is precluded from making indi-
viduals second-class citizens.75
In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,76 the Supreme Court
held that the state could not lease public property to a restaurant that
refused to serve individuals because of their race, since the state
would thereby be a party to making such individuals second-class
citizens.7 7 While "private conduct abridging individual rights does
no violence to the Equal Protection Clause," 78 notwithstanding that it
is "discriminatory or wrongful, 79 the state is not entitled to make
such distinctions among its citizens. As the Court suggested in
United States Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno,80 "if the consti-
tutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything,
74. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS:
RACE, GENDER, RELIGION AS ANALOGIES 112 (1999) ("The expression
through public law of one form of sectarian conscience against another form of
conscience, without compelling justification in public arguments available to
all, is constitutionally invidious, and therefore constitutionally suspect, reli-
gious intolerance."); WALZER, supra note 36, at 70 ("[T]he more extreme
members of religious majorities aim to control everyone's behavior-in the
name of a supposedly common (Judeo-Christian, say) tradition, of 'family val-
ues,' or of their own certainties about what is right and wrong. This is surely
an example of religious intolerance."); cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
211-12 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("A State can no more punish private
behavior because of religious intolerance than it can punish such behavior be-
cause of racial animus."). See generally David A.J. Richards, Sexual Prefer-
ence As a Suspect (Religious) Classification: An Alternative Perspective on the
Unconstitutionality of Anti-Lesbian/Gay Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 491
(1994) (arguing that orientation discrimination is a form of religious intoler-
ance prohibited by the United States Constitution).
75. See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 169 (1964) (striking down a law
that created "a second-class citizenship" for naturalized citizens); see also
Hooper v. Bemalillo County, 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985) (striking down a New
Mexico statute which "creates two tiers of resident Vietnam veterans, identify-
ing resident veterans who settled in the State after May 8, 1976, as in a sense
'second-class citizens"').
76. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
77. See id. at 724-25.
78. Id. at 722.
79. See id. at 721 (quoting Shelley V. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)).
80. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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it must at the very least mean that a bare.., desire to harm a politi-
cally unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest. ' 81 Further, the Court has made clear that this equal protec-
tion limitation includes attempts by states to harm on the basis of ori-
entation. Thus, in Romer v. Evans,82 the Court suggested that be-
cause the state constitutional amendment at issue "classifie[d]
homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them
unequal to everyone else," 83 the amendment was unconstitutional.
Certainly, the claim is not that the state is precluded from mak-
ing any distinctions among its citizens. The Equal Protection Clause
"does not require that all persons be dealt with identically." 84 The
"interpretation of constitutional principles must not be too literal
[since] ... the machinery of government would not work if it were
not allowed a little play in its joints."85 Yet, precluding the state
from targeting a class to make them unequal to everyone else can
hardly be said to be so limiting as to impose a strait jacket on the
state.
Commentators are correct to suggest that there is an important
difference between toleration or accommodation on the one hand and
endorsement on the other. As Establishment Clause jurisprudence
makes clear, the state should not be implying that certain citizens are
outsiders, who are not full members of the community. The same
point has been made in other contexts as well-the state must not
create classifications to indicate that certain citizens are "second-
class" or are unequal to everyone else. Thus, a state's refusal to rec-
ognize same-sex marriages because it wants to communicate that
gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered people are second-class
citizens thereby provides a reason to strike, rather than uphold, the
legislation at issue.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION VERSUS LEGISLATIVE CREATION
Even if one rejects that the endorsement test analogy supports
the claim that the state should refuse to recognize same-sex unions,
81. Id. at 534.
82. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
83. Id. at 635.
84. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966).
85. Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931).
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one might be tempted to accept a different rationale that has been of-
fered to support that contention. Commentators suggest that some
activities or relationships are prohibited, some permitted, and some
afforded protection. Those in the latter group are "preferred" and,
these commentators suggest, same-sex relationships should at best be
permitted, but should not be afforded this special "preferred" status.
A. On Permitting Versus Protecting
Bruce Hafen distinguishes between three different categories of
conduct: "(1) protected conduct (such as political speech), which is
protected by a preferred constitutional right; (2) permitted conduct
(such as driving a car), which is the subject neither of constitutional
protection nor of unusual prohibitions; and (3) prohibited conduct
(such as robbery) which is forbidden by a criminal sanction .... 
86
He argues that there is a significant difference between protected and
permitted conduct, even bracketing the content of the conduct. Thus,
suppose that there are two societies. In one, a particular conduct is
protected and in another that very same conduct is merely permitted.
Although one would not be able to distinguish between the contents
of the conduct permitted in the two societies, the conduct in the first
society would have a preferred status, 87 if only because the legisla-
ture in the second society, but not in the first, could easily criminal-
ize the conduct at issue sometime in the future.
In Trop v. Dulles,88 the Supreme Court discussed the use of de-
nationalization as a punishment. The Court pointed out that such a
"punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and inter-
national political community." 89 Stripping him of that status would
not be a physical punishment, and a country might in fact "accord
86. Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and
Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MiCH. L.
REv. 463, 546 (1983).
87. See id. ("Judicial recognition of a substantive due process liberty inter-
est gives extraordinary constitutional protection to the activity involved. Such
judicial recognition, however, differs substantially from legislative action to
accomplish the same result, no matter how similar the specific decrees may
be.").
88. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
89. Id. at 101.
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him some rights." 90 Nonetheless, "his enjoyment of even the limited
rights of an alien might be subject to termination at any time,"9' and
his very existence would be "at the sufferance of the country in
which he happens to find himself.
92
The Trop Court was suggesting that denationalization was an
extreme punishment, which violated the Eighth Amendment's bar on
cruel and unusual punishment, 93 even if the denationalized citizen
might in fact enjoy many of the same rights and privileges that others
enjoyed.94 Precisely because those rights and privileges could be
withdrawn at any time, the denationalized citizen would be in a pre-
carious position.95 Such a citizen might always fear, for example,
that because of a change in the political climate he might suddenly be
deprived of the rights that he had previously enjoyed. Thus, accord-
ing to the Trop Court, changing the status of the rights from pre-
ferred (constitutionally protected) to permitted (recognized, but only
at the sufferance of the legislature) was itself so significant that
Eighth Amendment protections were implicated.
In his concurrence in Wieman v. Updegraff96 Justice Black dis-
cussed the First Amendment right of free expression.97 He pointed
out that "individuals are guaranteed an undiluted and unequivocal
right to express themselves on questions of current public interest,"
and made clear that this "means that Americans discuss such ques-
tions as of right and not on sufferance of legislatures, courts or any
other governmental agencies."
98
The difference between having a right protected by the Constitu-
tion and having a privilege on sufferance of the legislature does not
involve the content of the liberty at issue. Justice Black's point is
90. Id.
91. Id. at 101-02.
92. Id. at 101.
93. See id. ("We believe.., that use of denationalization as a punishment is
barred by the Eighth Amendment.").
94. See id. at 102 ("It is no answer to suggest that all the disastrous conse-
quences of this fate may not be brought to bear on a stateless person. The
threat makes the punishment obnoxious.").
95. See id. ("It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and
distress.").
96. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
97. See id. at 192-94 (Black, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 194 (Black, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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that the liberty of free expression is greatly diminished if one has that
liberty only on sufferance and not as a matter of constitutional right,
even if the liberty accorded as a matter of sufferance would permit
one to do as much as would a similar liberty accorded as a matter of
constitutional right.99
Professor Hafen illustrates the difference between constitution-
ally protected and statutorily permitted conduct by suggesting that
sexual relations within marriage are protected, whereas sexual rela-
tions outside of marriage are either prohibited or merely permitted.' 00
Part of his point was to suggest that when a judge strikes down a
statute prohibiting particular conduct on constitutional grounds, the
conduct moves from the prohibited to the protected category,
whereas when a legislature decriminalizes conduct, the conduct
moves from the prohibited to the permitted category. 10 1 While the
conduct will be permissible whether the statute was repealed or, in-
stead, struck down as unconstitutional, those engaging in the conduct
might feel much more secure if it was constitutionally protected
rather than merely legislatively permitted.
B. Sodomy
Consider sodomy. Statutes prohibiting sodomy have sometimes
been repealed' 0 2 and sometimes struck down on state constitutional
99. See id. at 193-94 (Black, J., concurring).
100. See Hafen, supra note 86, at 546.
101. See id. at 547.
These cases illustrate that judicial action in removing criminal penal-
ties against sexual conduct can achieve a very different result from
legislative action toward the same end. Since the justification for ju-
dicial action of this kind must ordinarily be grounded in a constitu-
tional right, decriminalization decisions by the judiciary are likely to
move conduct from category (3) all the way across the spectrum to
category (1). Legislative decisions to decriminalize are far less sig-
nificant, because they move a given kind of conduct only from cate-
gory (3) to category (2).
Id.
102. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (2000) ("Every person who is convicted
of the abominable and detestable crime against nature with any beast, shall be
imprisoned for not more than twenty (20) years nor less than seven (7)
years."). In 1998, the Rhode Island legislature deleted "mankind" from the
section. See id. notes to decisions ("Most of the annotations appearing below
were decided prior to the 1998 amendment to this section, which deleted
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grounds. 103 When the statute is found to violate state constitutional
guarantees, it cannot be reenacted unless the state constitution itself
is amended, whereas a statute that has been repealed could simply be
reenacted.10 4 Individuals who foresee that they might wish to engage
in sodomitical relations sometime in the future might feel much more
secure in a state in which such behavior was constitutionally pro-
tected than they would feel in a state in which the law criminalizing
such behavior had merely been repealed, given the possibility of re-
enactment. 1
05
It is important to understand what the example involving the
sodomy statutes illustrates and what it does not. It does illustrate
why a liberty is more secure if constitutionally protected rather than
merely legislatively permitted. However, it neither illustrates why
states are permitted to impose severe penalties on lesbians, gays, and
bisexuals, nor why there cannot be a right to marry a same-sex part-
ner, despite claims to the contrary by members of the judiciary and
the academy.
Justice Scalia has suggested that the very possibility that sod-
omy statutes may be passed without offending the Federal Constitu-
tion gives the states great leeway with respect to how they treat les-
bians, gays, and bisexuals. °6 In Romer v. Evans,10 7 Justice Scalia
suggested, "If it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make
homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible
for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual
'mankind' from the section."); see also Ed Vogel, Few Funds Kept '93 Session
in Check, LAS VEGAS REV. J., July 5, 1993, at 1B ("Legislators repealed the
82-year-old sodomy law and legalized homosexual sex acts in private between
consenting adults.").
103. See Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1993); Gryczan
v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997); People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y.
1980).
104. See J. Drew Page, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment and Sod-
omy Statutes: The Breakdown of the Solem v. Helm Test, 56 U. Ci. L. REV.
367, 379 n.68 (1989) (discussing the reenactment of sodomy statutes by Ala-
bama, Arkansas, and Georgia).
105. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of
Antigay Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1327, 1344 n.58 (2000) (discussing two states that reregulated sodomy).
106. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
107. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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conduct."'1 8 Thus, a state would not, in fact, have to criminalize
same-sex relations to make it permissible for the state to pass other
laws adversely impacting lesbians and gays-the mere possibility of
criminalization would suffice.
Perhaps it will be thought that this is an unfair interpretation of
Justice Scalia's position. Yet, Justice Scalia argued that Colorado's
Amendment 2 was justified as an expression of hostility to homosex-
ual conduct, 0 9 notwithstanding Colorado's having been one of the
first states to repeal its sodomy law110 and the amendment's not hav-
ing been limited to sodomy but, instead, having targeted "homosex-
ual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices, or relation-
ships.""1
Several points should be made about the breadth of Amendment
2. Even if it had "merely" been limited to same-sex conduct and
practices, it presumably would have included a number of activities
that do not involve sodomy, such as handholding, embracing, kiss-
ing, etc., since these might also qualify as same-sex practices. But
the amendment was much broader than that, since it also targeted ori-
entation and relationships.
The Romer majority recognized that the "broad language" of the
amendment could effect a "[s]weeping and comprehensive . . .
change" in the law. 112 However, Justice Scalia saw nothing wrong
with this broad sweep, characterizing the amendment as "a modest
attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sex-
ual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to re-
vise those mores through [the] use of the laws."
113
Justice Scalia's characterization was surprising on several
counts. For example, the "modest" attempt was described by the ma-
jority as "unprecedented in our jurisprudence."' 14 The Court further
made clear that it was not within the country's "constitutional
108. Id. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 644 (imputing to Colorad-
ans hostility and moral disapproval of same-sex relations) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
110. See id. at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b).
112. Id. at 627, 630.
113. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 633.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW
tradition to enact laws of this sort."115 While Justice Scalia claimed
in dissent that "[n]o principle... imagined by this Court in the past
200 years, prohibits what Colorado has done here," 116 he later im-
plied in a dissenting opinion that Romer involved a fairly standard
application of electoral process jurisprudence. 117
Justice Scalia referred to lesbians, gays, and bisexuals as a "po-
litically powerful minority," even though (1) they had lost the refer-
endum vote, and (2) the evidence that they had overwhelming power
had merely been that they had been included in anti-discrimination
ordinances in the cities of Denver, Boulder, and Aspen." 8 Given
115. Id.
116. Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518
U.S. 1001, 1001 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The consequence of its [Ro-
mer's] holding is that homosexuals in a city (or other electoral subunit) that
wishes to accord them special protection cannot be compelled to achieve a
state constitutional amendment in order to have the benefit of that democratic
preference."). For a discussion of electoral process jurisprudence and its im-
plications for same-sex marriage, see generally Mark Strasser, From Colorado
to Alaska by Way of Cincinnati: On Romer, Equality Foundation, and the Con-
stitutionality of Referenda, 36 Hous. L. REv. 1193 (1999) (concluding that the
Supreme Court's referendum jurisprudence would not allow the Alaska
amendment banning same-sex unions to stand); Mark Strasser, Same-Sex Mar-
riage Referenda and the Constitution: On Hunter, Romer, and Electoral Proc-
ess Guarantees, 64 ALB. L. REV. 949 (2001) (concluding that referenda in four
states limiting the marriage rights of same-sex couples are constitutionally vul-
nerable because those same-sex marriage initiatives violate electoral process
guarantees).
118. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-24 (stating that Denver, Aspen, and Boul-
der had nondiscrimination ordinances).
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that such ordinances often include a whole host of groups, 119 being
included is hardly an indication of overwhehning power.
119. See, e.g., ASPEN, COLO. MUN. CODE § 15.04.570 (2000) which states
that:
"Discrimination" or "to discriminate" means, without limitation, any
act which because of race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, national
origin, sex, age, marital status, physical handicaps, affectional or sex-
ual orientation, family responsibility, or political affiliation, results in
the unequal treatment or separation of any person or denies, prevents,
limits or otherwise adversely affects, the benefit or enjoyment by any
person of employment, ownership or occupancy of real property or
public services or accommodations.
ASPEN, COLO. MUN. CODE § 15.04.570 (2000), available at
http://bpc.iserver.net/codes/aspen/index.html; see also DISCRIMINATION IN
HOUSING PROHIBITED, BOULDER, COLO. REV. CODE § 12-1-2 (1981), avail-
able at http://www.ci-boulder.co.us/cao/brc/12-1.html, stating:
(a) It is an unfair housing practice, and no person:
(1) Who has the right of ownership or possession or the right of trans-
fer, sale, rental, or lease of any housing or any agent of such person
shall:
(A) Refuse to show, sell, transfer, rent, or lease or refuse to receive
and transmit any bonafide offer to buy, sell, rent, or lease or other-
wise to deny to or withhold from any individual such housing be-
cause of the race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender vari-
ance, marital status, religion, national origin, ancestry, pregnancy,
parenthood, custody of a minor child, or mental or physical disabil-
ity of that individual or such individual's friends or associates;
(B) Discriminate against any individual because of the race, creed,
color, sex, sexual orientation, gender variance, marital status, relig-
ion, national origin, ancestry, pregnancy, parenthood, custody of a
minor child, or mental or physical disability of the individual or
such individual's friends or associates in the terms, conditions, or
privileges pertaining to any facilities or services in connection with
a transfer, sale, rental, or lease of housing; or
(C) Cause to be made any written or oral inquiry or record concern-
ing the race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender variance,
marital status, religion, national origin, ancestry, pregnancy, parent-
hood, custody of a minor child, or mental or physical disability of
an individual seeking to purchase, rent, or lease any housing or of
such individual's friends or associates, but nothing in this section
prohibits using a form or making a record or inquiry for the purpose
of required government reporting or for a program to provide op-
portunities for persons who have been traditional targets of dis-
crimination on the bases here prohibited.
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Justice Scalia's cormments in his dissent in Romer might be con-
trasted with his comments in dissent in Board of Education of Kiryas
Joel Village School District v. Grumet.120 In Grumet, the Court held
that New York violated the Establishment Clause by setting up a
special school district for members of the Satmar religious sect.
121
Justice Scalia wrote, "The Court today finds that the Powers That Be,
up in Albany, have conspired to effect an establishment of the Sat-
mar Hasidim." 122 He then suggested that it was absurd to think that
"the Satmar had become so powerful, so closely allied with Mam-
mon, as to have become an 'establishment' of the Empire State."'
23
Needless to say, the Grumet majority had neither said nor im-
plied that the New York Legislature had been commandeered by the
Satmar Hasidim. Justice Scalia's comments were especially surpris-
ing because he would seem to be the most likely individual currently
on the Court to have made such a charge. One characterizing gays
and lesbians as politically powerful when, after all, slightly over 53%
of the Colorado electorate votedfor Amendment 2,124 might wrongly
be tempted to think a small group125 very powerful indeed if legisla-
tion were passed benefiting them. 126 The point here, of course, is not
to suggest that the Satmar Hasidim controlled the New York Legisla-
ture but, rather, that Scalia's suggesting that Amendment 2 propo-
nents were a tolerant group engaging in a modest attempt to defend
themselves against a powerful "Kulturkampf" enemy 12 7 speaks more
about Justice Scalia's own particular views concerning lesbians,
120. 512 U.S. 687, 732 (1994).
121. Seeid. at705,711-12.
122. Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124. See Jason D. Kimpel, Note, "Distinctions Without a Difference": How
the Sixth Circuit Misread Romer v. Evans, 74 IND. L.J. 991, 993 (1999) (stat-
ing that 53.4% of the Colorado electorate voted for Amendment 2).
125. See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 691 (noting that although the size of the sect
was not offered in the opinion, the village of Kiryas Joel was said to have had a
population of 8500).
126. See id. at 690 ("[A] special state statute passed in 1989 carved out a
separate district, following village lines, to serve this distinctive population.
1989 N.Y. Laws, ch. 748.").
127. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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gays, bisexuals, and transgendered people than it speaks to realistic
assessments of power concentrations.
128
Justice Scalia is remarkably willing to uphold legislation that
imposes burdens on lesbians, gays, and bisexuals, notwithstanding
the unacceptable legal positions that are thereby at least implicitly
adopted. One infers from Justice Scalia's comments not only that
much same-sex conduct is an acceptable stand-in for same-sex sod-
omy, but that, "where criminal sanctions are not involved, homosex-
ual 'orientation' is an acceptable stand-in for homosexual con-
duct."'129 Lest one not understand just how broad that latter stand-in
category is, Justice Scalia explains that an orientation merely in-
volves one's having a tendency or desire to engage in a particular ac-
tivity. 130 Thus, anyone who engages in or desires to engage in same-
sex practices or conduct is potentially subject to the amendment's
reach.
According to Justice Scalia, Amendment 2 was constitutional
because Colorado could have criminalized sodomy even though it
chose not to do so. 131 The implications of this position are startling.
Consider adultery, which Colorado not only could criminalize but in
fact does criminalize. 132 If the state is justifiably thought to have a
strong public policy against sodomy despite the state's having de-
criminalized it years ago, the state certainly should be thought to
have a strong public policy against adultery. Presumably, Justice
Scalia would have no objection to the imposition of rather severe
civil penalties for anyone who manifested an adulterous "orientation"
or who engaged in such "conduct, practices or relationships."' 133 Not
only might married people who, for example, kissed or embraced a
nonspouse be at risk, but individuals who even had a desire to
128. See id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (likening those who engage in
same-sex relations to murderers); cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 200
(1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the "Court's almost obsessive
focus on homosexual activity").
129. Romer, 517 U.S. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. See id. at 641-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. See id. at 641, 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-501 (1986) ("Any sexual intercourse by a
married person other than with that person's spouse is adultery, which is pro-
hibited.").
133. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 (quoting Amendment 2).
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engage in such activity might be subject to civil penalty.' 34 While
one would assume that very few on the Court would be willing to
uphold the constitutionality of statutes penalizing married individuals
for lusting in their hearts, 35 Justice Scalia would seem committed to
that position.
Suppose that the focus of the discussion shifts from states that
could but do not criminalize sodomy to states that in fact criminalize
sodomy. Even so, the implications that such statutes pose have been
greatly misrepresented. For example, several commentators have
suggested that because several states still have sodomy statutes, the
right to marry a same-sex partner cannot be a fundamental right.
136
134. See Mark Strasser, Sex, Law, and the Sacred Precincts of the Marital
Bedroom: On State and Federal Right to Privacy Jurisprudence, 14 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICs & PUB. POL'Y 753, 766-69 (2000) (analyzing the implica-
tions of Scalia's position for those who might be tempted to engage in fornica-
tion or adultery).
135. Cf Reverend Nancy Rockwell, Lust and the Love of God, 13 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 427, 441 (1993) (discussing Jimmy Carter's admission that he
had committed adultery in his heart many times).
136. See Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors: Implications for In-
terjurisdictional Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 147, 151 (1998) (stating that given Bowers, same-sex marriage propo-
nents face an impossible uphill climb in making substantive due process argu-
ments under the Federal Constitution); Andrew H. Friedman, Same-Sex Mar-
riage and the Right to Privacy: Abandoning Scriptural, Canonical, and
Natural Law Based Definitions of Marriage, 35 HOw. L.J. 173, 214 (1992)
("The decision in Bowers v. Hardwick upholding state statutes prohibiting ho-
mosexual sodomy deals a serious, if not fatal, blow to any arguments that state
prohibitions against same-sex marriages are unconstitutional."); Lynn Marie
Kohm, Liberty and Marriage-Baehr and Beyond: Due Process in 1998, 12
BYU J. PUB. L. 253, 275 (1998) ("The problem with a clear description of
same-sex marriage is that the right itself requires a right to sodomy and homo-
sexual sexual activity within the carefully crafted description of the asserted
liberty."); Richard Ante, Book Review, Same-Sex Marriage and the Construc-
tion of Family: An Historical Perspective, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 421, 424
(1995) (stating that given Bowers, "the case law seems to signal a defeat for
proponents of same-sex unions"); Lisa M. Farabee, Note, Marriage, Equal
Protection, and the New Judicial Federalism: A View from the States, 14 YALE
L. & POL'Y REV. 237, 246 (1996) ("Because the Bowers court explicitly re-
fused to recognize a right for homosexuals to engage in consensual sexual rela-
tionships, federal doctrine offers little promise for same-sex marriage litiga-
tion."); Mary F. Gardner, Note, Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co.: Much Ado About
Nothing?, 35 VILL. L. REV. 361, 363 (1990) ("[I]n many states, the recognition
of a right to same-sex marriage would conflict with state laws that criminalize
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Yet, most states with sodomy statutes criminalize both same-sex and
different-sex sodomy.137 If indeed a state criminalizing same-sex
sodomy could not recognize same-sex marriage as a fundamental
right, then a state criminalizing different-sex sodomy presumably
could not recognize different-sex marriage as a fundamental right.
Yet, the latter contention is absurd, since the Court has recognized
that marriage is a fundamental right, 138 and that right is no less fun-
damental in states that criminalize different-sex sodomy.
The reason that the existence of a sodomy statute does not pre-
clude the recognition that the right to marry a different-sex partner is
fundamental is not that married individuals do not engage in sodo-
mitical relations. On the contrary, they do,139 but their right to do so
is not subject to the statutory prohibition, 14 and probably is pro-
tected by the Federal Constitution. So, too, were same-sex mar-
riages recognized, sodomitical relations within marriage would pre-
sumably not be subject to the statutory prohibition and, in any event,
would likely be protected by the Federal Constitution. Thus, whether
consensual sodomy."); Kevin H. Lewis, Note, Equal Protection After Romer v.
Evans: Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act and Other Laws, 49
HASTINGS L.J. 175, 184 (1997) ("The argument for same-sex marriage based
on the general right to privacy or the Due Process Clause has probably been
foreclosed by Bowers v. Hardwick... .
137. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Sweeping Reform from Small Rules?
Anti-Bias Canons As a Substitute for Heightened Scrutiny, 85 MINN. L. REV.
363, 390 n. 114 (2000) (explaining that in thirteen states the sodomy statutes do
not distinguish between same-sex and different-sex relations, whereas in five
states only same-sex sodomitical relations are prohibited).
138. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 726 (1997) (dis-
cussing fundamental rights, including the right to marry).
139. See Teresa M. Bruce, Note, Doing the Nasty: An Argument for Bringing
Same-Sex Erotic Conduct Back into the Courtroom, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
1135, 1143 (1996) (discussing briefs for Bowers "prepared by the American
Psychological Association and the American Public Health Association indi-
cating that eighty percent of married couples practiced oral and/or anal sex;
that ninety-five percent of American men had engaged in oral sex; and that
homosexuals were no more likely than heterosexuals to violate sodomy laws").
140. See Strasser, supra note 134, at 760 ("[T]hose states that have sodomy
laws have created exceptions for married couples either through their legisla-
tures or their courts.").
141. See Mark Strasser, Sodomy, Adultery, and Same-Sex Marriage: On Le-
gal Analysis and Fundamental Interests, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 313, 334
n. 115 (1998) (listing several courts suggesting that consensual marital sodomy
is constitutionally protected).
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or not Bowers is still good law, 14 2 same-sex sodomy within marriage
would presumably not be subject to criminal penalty, and the exis-
tence of sodomy statutes would have no effect on whether there is a
fundamental right to marry a same-sex partner. 1
43
There is yet another reason to reject the claim that the existence
of sodomy statutes precludes the recognition that the right to marry a
same-sex partner involves a fundamental interest protected by the
Constitution. Before the right to marry someone of another race was
recognized as protected by the Federal Constitution,144 interracial
marriage had long been prohibited, in some states for centuries.
145
Indeed, when the Court struck down Virginia's anti-miscegenation
statutes in Loving v. Virginia,14 6 several states had state constitu-
tional provisions precluding interracial marriage. 47 Were the ration-
ale suggested by these commentators an accurate reflection of consti-
tutional doctrine, the right to marry someone of another race would
not have been recognized as constitutionally protected and, indeed,
many of the rights recognized as protected by the right to privacy
would not have been so recognized.1
48
142. See DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS:
RACE, GENDER, RELIGION AS ANALOGIES 131 (1999) (arguing that Bowers
"should be regarded as no longer authoritative").
143. For further discussion of this issue, see Strasser, supra note 141, at 333-
38.
144. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
145. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbothan, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Pu-
rity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77
GEO. L.J. 1967, 1967 n.5 (1989) (discussing Act XVI, 3 LAWS OF VA. 86, 86-
87 (Hening 1823) (enacted 1691), which stated that "interracial marriage [was
to be] punished by banishment from Virginia within three months"); cf Lov-
ing, 388 U.S. at 6 ("Penalties for miscegenation arose as an incident to slavery
and have been common in Virginia since the colonial period.").
146. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
147. See id. at 6 n.5 (listing several states with constitutional provisions pre-
cluding interracial marriage).
148. Cf Strasser, supra note 134, at 755.
The difficulty with this justification was not that the Court was wrong
to conclude that the protection of sodomy was not deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition, but merely that the Court might
have made the same point about contraception, abortion, and interra-
cial marriage, and each of those is nonetheless protected by the right
to privacy.
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C. Hafen's Tri-Partite Analysis Applied to Relationships
The sodomy example helps illustrate some of the flaws in the
arguments offered by same-sex marriage opponents. That there are
or even could be laws against sodomy hardly establishes that same-
sex marriage could not be a fundamental right. Further, theorists of-
fering such an argument seem not to appreciate its implications,
since those states whose constitutions protect sodomy as part of the
right to privacy presumably should include same-sex marriage within
the right to privacy as well.149 After all, the Bowers Court upheld
Georgia's sodomy law because the Court saw "[n]o connection be-
tween family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homo-
sexual activity on the other.. . ,"'S Yet, considering that there is an
obvious connection between same-sex marriage on the one hand and
family and marriage on the other, state constitutions that protect sod-
omy and that reflect the priorities of the Federal Constitution should
protect same-sex marriage as well.151
Not only has Professor Hafen's prohibited/permitted/preferred
analysis been applied to types of sexual relations, e.g., sodomy,1
5 2
but Professors Duncan and Wardle have also applied it to types of
149. See Wardle, supra note 64, at 61, stating:
The difference between state tolerance and preference justifies de-
criminalizing some homosexual relations without legalizing same-sex
marriage. Thus, the argument that a state that does not prohibit all
homosexual activities may not deny homosexuals the preferred marital
status is a fallacious argument because it presumes that the current il-
legality of same-sex marriage is on par with the current illegality of
sodomy when legalizing the latter produces permitted behavior and
legalizing the former produces preferred behavior.
Id. The point here is that according to Wardle's account sodomy is "pre-
ferred' if constitutionally protected and thus, presumably, a state which consti-
tutionally protected sodomy would constitutionally protect same-sex marriage
as well.
150. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
151. See Strasser, supra note 141, at 334, stating:
Ironically, those who link sodomy statutes and same-sex marriage
bans risk having that argument turned on its head-in those states in
which the sodomy bans have been held unconstitutional on due proc-
ess grounds, the states' constitutional due process guarantees might
require that the right to same-sex marriage be recognized.
Id.
152. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 752.
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personal relationships. 5 3 They suggest that same-sex relationships
should at best be placed in the "permitted" category, whereas differ-
ent-sex marriages are and should be placed in the preferred cate-
gory.154  They then argue that same-sex marriage proponents are
seeking "special" treatment when attempting to have something cur-
rently in the permitted category instead included within the preferred
category.' 55 However, there are a number of reasons why this analy-
sis is faulty.
Same-sex marriage proponents are only seeking the same privi-
leges that others have. It is hardly a request for "special treatment"
in any common sense of the term when individuals are merely
"struggl[ing] 'to change a social order that [has] consistently treated
them as second class citizens," ' 156 and are seeking "only the equal
respect and equal treatment to which they [are] constitutionally enti-
tled."
, 157
Commentators are correct to talk about marriage as a "preferred
relationship."' 58  The right to marry is an extremely important
153. Duncan, supra note 2, at 593; Wardle, supra note 2 at 758.
154. See Richard F. Duncan, The Narrow and Shallow Bite ofRomer and the
Eminent Rationality of Dual-Gender Marriage: A (Partial) Response to Pro-
fessor Koppelman, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 147, 163 (1997) (arguing that
different-sex marriage is and should be in the preferred category whereas
same-sex relationships should not be); Wardle, supra note 64, at 61.
155. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 593; Wardle, supra note 2, at 752; see also
Kevin G. Clarkson et al., The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People's
Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA L. REv. 213, 220 (1999), stating:
The analysis of the right to privacy in Brause confuses tolerance and
preference. Relations and conduct may be legally categorized in at
least three different ways-as "preferred," "permitted," or "prohib-
ited." Marriage is the classic example of a preferred relationship. It is
one of the most highly protected, historically favored relations in the
law. Thus, the claim for same-sex marriage is not a claim for mere
tolerance, but for special preference. The principles of tolerance or
privacy do not justify legalization of same-sex marriage because mar-
riage is much more than a permitted, private relation, it is a legally
preferred, public status.
Id. at 220.
156. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,
426 (1990) (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912
(1982)).
157. Id.
158. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 751.
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right159 and, as the Court has made clear, "'fundamental rights may
not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elec-
tions."",160 The issue at hand is not whether marriage will remain
"preferred," but who will be entitled to marry.
Some commentators deny that the issue is who should be al-
lowed to marry, claiming that lesbians and gays, like everyone else,
can marry-they simply cannot marry someone of their own sex.
161
One could easily imagine the analogous argument having been made
when interracial couples wished to marry. Thus, the would-be mar-
rieds had the right to marry-they simply did not have the right to
marry someone of another race. Such an argument is no more per-
suasive in the context under discussion here than it was when re-
jected in the interracial marriage context. Indeed, Professors Wardle
and Duncan seem not to appreciate that the analogs of their argu-
ments might have been offered by those seeking to preclude the rec-
ognition of interracial marriage. For example, interracial marriage
opponents might have noted that some states permitted interracial
marriage and others did not, and then would have argued that the fact
that such relationships were permitted would not have made them
"preferred." These commentators might further have claimed that
interracial marriage proponents were "confus[ing] tolerance with
preference."1
62
There are other respects in which the analogs of the Wardle-
Duncan arguments might have been used to advantage by those sup-
porting anti-miscegenation laws. In response to the claim that inter-
racial marriage bans manifested impermissible bias, these commenta-
tors might have claimed that "society has acted upon a longstanding
moral consensus that conceives of marriage as a unique two-person
Ccommunity' 163 of individuals of the same race. 164 The interracial
159. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
160. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 304-05 (2000) (quot-
ing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
161. See, e.g., Lynne Marie Kohm, A Reply to "Principles and Prejudice":
Marriage and the Realization that Principles Win Over Political Will, 22 J.
CONTEMP. L. 293, 302 (1996).
162. Wardle, supra note 2, at 751.
163. Duncan, supra note 154, at 159.
164. Indeed, it has been suggested that God conceives of marriage as com-
posed of individuals of the same race. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 discussing the
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marriage opponents might have continued, "To say that other kinds
of relationships are not within society's concept of marriage is not an
expression of intolerance or animosity. One kind of relationship gets
the benefit of a moral preference, and all others receive tolerance."'
165
That these kinds of arguments were rejected in the context of interra-
cial marriage suggests that they should not be given credence in this
context either.
The interracial marriage opponents described above, like the
same-sex marriage opponents discussed in this Article, have con-
fused types of relationships with types of people. A society might
decide to give one relationship (marriage) preference over other
kinds of relationships (nonmarital cohabitation) without at the same
time endorsing the view that certain classes of individuals will be
barred from enjoying that preferred status. Thus, the arguments of
the interracial and same-sex marriage opponents are unpersuasive for
the same reason-they have confused giving preference to a status
with giving preference to particular people.
Proponents of interracial or same-sex marriages are not denying
that marriage enjoys a preferred status,' 66 and thus hardly are confus-
ing toleration with preference. Instead, they are merely suggesting
that the state is not allowed to designate certain people as second-
class citizens by refusing to permit them to marry.
Professor Duncan offers some consolation to those same-sex
couples who have been denied the right to marry. After all, he sug-
gests, individuals "may enter into committed same-sex relationships,
perhaps even with benefit of clergy, and consider themselves mar-
ried. In this latter case, although same-sex couples are denied the le-
gal and public status of married persons, they are free to live with
trial court opinion that:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red,
and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interfer-
ence with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages.
The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for
the races to mix.
Id.
165. Duncan, supra note 154, at 159.
166. It is of course true that same-sex marriage opponents and proponents
can deny that marriage should be preferred-whether marriage is or should be
preferred is simply an independent issue about which theorists might have dif-
fering views.
[Vol. 35:65
November 2001] TOLERATIONANDSAMESEX-MA4RRJAGE 97
and love whomever they wish."'167 Yet, the state would hardly be
free to preclude interracial marriage as long as it permitted those thus
deprived "to live with and love whomever they wish[ed]." 168
One aspect of the same-sex marriage debate that is underappre-
ciated is that it has important implications for right-to-marry juris-
prudence more generally. For example, some same-sex marriage
opponents suggest that Loving merely stands for the proposition that
interracial marriages cannot be criminalized. 169 According to this
view, as long as the state does not criminalize the attempt to marry
someone of another race, 170 it is permitted not only to deny the legal
and public status of marriage to interracial couples, but to prevent
them from living together. Basically, the state would simply enforce
its "neutral" statutes prohibiting nonmarital cohabitation. 17' Need-
less to say, this is a radical reworking of the right-to-marry jurispr-
dence which is supported neither by Loving itself nor by the subse-
quent right-to-marry jurisprudence.
72
D. The Hafen Analysis Applied to Marriage
Couples who are permitted to live together but not to marry are
at a disadvantage, at least in part, because they have been denied the
legal and public status of married persons. Suppose, however, that
the legislature creates a special status for certain couples called "per-
sonal partnerships," which, by statute, confers all of the benefits of
marriage. Even if one brackets the presumed stigma attached to the
legislature's having set up a different status which mirrors marriage
167. Duncan, supra note 2, at 598.
168. Id.
169. For a discussion of the view offered by some same-sex marriage oppo-
nents that Loving might have been decided differently if Virginia had not
criminalized interracial marriage, see Mark Strasser, Loving Baehr, and the
Right to Marry: On Legal Argumentation and Sophistical Rhetoric, 24 NOVA
L. REV. 769, 771-77 (2000).
170. See supra note 166.
171. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). In McLaughlin,
the Court struck down Florida's punishing interracial cohabitation more se-
verely than intraracial cohabitation. See id. at 196. However, the Court did
not strike down nonmarital cohabitation statutes and the Court made clear that
McLaughlin could have been prosecuted under the existing (race-neutral) stat-
ute. See id.
172. See Strasser, supra note 169, at 771-77.
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but does not have that name, 173 there is an additional difficulty,
namely, that all of the benefits of "personal partnerships" could dis-
appear were the legislators to have a change of heart and repeal the
legislation.
Professor Hafen's analysis suggests why marriage would be
preferable to "personal partnerships," even if each status accorded
the same benefits. Marriage is constitutionally protected, while per-
sonal partnerships would be at the sufferance of the legislature sub-
ject to repeal with a change in legislative composition or sentiment.
Consider Vermont's civil union status, which entitles same-sex
couples to all of the rights and responsibilities of marriage. Even if
the rights and responsibilities were identical to those that would be
conferred by marriage, 174 that status is nonetheless significantly infe-
rior because it has been legislatively conferred rather than constitu-
tionally protected.' 75  Thus, same-sex marriage opponents' views
notwithstanding, Professor Hafen's analysis shows why same-sex
unions must be constitutionally protected rather than accorded rec-
ognition on sufferance of the legislature. It certainly does not show
why such unions should not be recognized at all, just as it does not
show why states would be permitted to prefer intraracial marriages
over interracial unions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Same-sex marriage opponents argue that same-sex unions
should not be legally recognized because the state would thereby be
endorsing such unions. Yet, this is unpersuasive both because legal
recognition does not entail endorsement and, even if it did, this
173. For a discussion of why Vermont's civil unions may offend state consti-
tutional guarantees because of this imposition of stigma, see Mark Strasser,
Mission Impossible: On Baker, Equal Benefits, and the Imposition of Stigma, 9
WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1 (2000).
174. But see id. at 11-16 (suggesting that they are not identical because states
are less likely to recognize civil unions than they would be to recognize same-
sex marriages).
175. The argument is somewhat more complicated in Vermont because the
legislative enactment was in response to the Vermont Supreme Court's finding
that the state constitution guaranteed equal benefits. See Baker v. State, 744
A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). If the Vermont Legislature repealed the civil union law,
it is unclear what the Vermont Supreme Court would do were a challenge to
come before it.
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would not be a reason to refuse to recognize such unions, since such
unions promote the same kinds of state interests that different-sex
unions promote and thus should be endorsed by the state.
Same-sex marriage opponents cite the endorsement text of Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence to support their claim that the state
distinguishes between endorsement and toleration. While they are
correct that the state recognizes the distinction, they are incorrect to
believe that their position is thereby supported, since the endorse-
ment test is used to determine which state practices are impermissible
because the state thereby prefers some citizens over others.
Commentators cite Hafen's analysis distinguishing between pre-
ferred and nonpreferred activities in an attempt to show why same-
sex unions should not be recognized. Yet, they misapply his analy-
sis, since it might be used to distinguish between marriage and other
types of cohabitation, but not to distinguish between those who will
be allowed to enjoy a particular status and those who will not. In-
deed, the Hafen analysis does not establish why the state should re-
fuse to recognize same-sex marriages any more than it establishes
why the state should refuse to recognize interracial marriages. On
the contrary, the analysis instead establishes why both interracial and
same-sex marriages should be recognized as a matter of constitu-
tional right rather than mere legislative sufferance.
Same-sex marriage opponents are correct that the endorsement
test of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the Hafen analysis
regarding tolerated and preferred activities are important in the same-
sex marriage debate. However, these commentators fail to appreci-
ate that the very arguments upon which they rely support rather than
undermine the state's recognition of same-sex unions and, in fact,
help to show why these commentators' positions are simply unsup-
portable in light of current law.
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